United States v. Cook is a Supreme Court case from 1877 that dealt with the issue of whether a federal court had the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner. The case involved a man named William Cook, who had been convicted of murder in the state of Georgia and sentenced to death. Cook filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional because the jury had been improperly selected. The Supreme Court held that the federal court did not have the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner, and that the state court had the exclusive power to determine the constitutionality of the conviction. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for federal prisoners, and that the state court was the proper forum for determining the constitutionality of a state conviction. The decision in United States v. Cook established the principle that federal courts do not have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.

In the dissenting opinion of United States v. Cook, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was wrong and should be overturned. He believed that Congress had not intended to criminalize a person’s mere possession of an unregistered firearm, but rather only those who used such firearms in furtherance of some other crime or illegal activity. In his view, if Congress had wanted to make it a crime for someone simply to possess an unregistered gun without any additional criminal conduct involved, they would have explicitly stated so in their legislation. Furthermore, he pointed out that this interpretation could lead to absurd results where people are punished for possessing guns even when there is no evidence whatsoever that they were planning on using them illegally or engaging in any other type of unlawful behavior with them. Ultimately, Justice Harlan concluded by stating his belief that the majority's ruling was overly broad and violated basic principles of statutory construction which require courts to interpret laws narrowly whenever possible so as not to infringe upon individual rights unnecessarily.