In the United States v. Dinitz case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Dinitz, who had been convicted for fraud but appealed on grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was forced to represent himself after his lawyer was ejected from court by a judge. The trial judge had removed Dinitz's attorney due to perceived misconduct during cross-examination of a government witness and did not allow him back into court until after the prosecution rested its case. This left Dinitz without legal representation for part of his trial which led him to argue that this constituted as a violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Dinitz’s claim and held that while judges have discretion in controlling courtroom conduct, they must also ensure defendants' constitutional rights are protected - including their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, it concluded that if an accused is deprived of counsel at any stage during proceedings where he has or should have legal representation then such deprivation can be considered harmful beyond reasonable doubt unless proven otherwise.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Dinitz, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, argued that the majority's decision failed to adequately protect a defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. They contended that Mr. Dinitz was denied his constitutional right when he was forced to proceed without his chosen lawyer after an unjustified removal from court proceedings by a trial judge who had personal animosity towards him. The dissenters believed this action constituted government misconduct which should have resulted in dismissal of charges rather than allowing retrial with new counsel as decided by the majority ruling. They further criticized the majority’s reliance on waiver doctrine arguing it doesn't apply here because no voluntary or knowing relinquishment of rights occurred; instead, they saw it as coercion due to circumstances created by judicial hostility against defense attorney.