In the case of United States v. Durham Lumber Co. et al., 1959, the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving federal income tax deductions related to timberland property owned by Durham Lumber Company and other defendants. The issue at hand was whether or not the taxpayers could deduct from their gross income an amount representing depletion of timber for years in which no cutting occurred but during which they had sustained allowable expenses for management, taxes, and interest attributable to such properties under Section 23(l) and (m) of Revenue Act 1936 & Internal Revenue Code 1939. The court held that these deductions were permissible only when there is actual extraction of timber; thus, it rejected taxpayer's claim for deduction in absence of any cuttings during those years.

The dissenting opinion in the United States v. Durham Lumber Co. case argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings and misinterpreted the Sherman Act, a federal law prohibiting certain business activities that reduce competition in the marketplace. The dissenters believed that there was no evidence of price-fixing or other anti-competitive practices by Durham Lumber Co., as required for a violation under this act to be established. They also disagreed with how broadly the majority interpreted "restraint of trade," arguing it should only apply to situations where there is an actual restriction on market competition, not merely potential or indirect effects on prices or output levels. Furthermore, they contended that even if such broad interpretation were accepted, it would still require proof of intent to monopolize which they found lacking in this case.