United States v. Canda is a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a foreign-born person who had been naturalized in the United States could be convicted of a crime in the United States. The case involved a man named Canda, who had been born in Italy and had been naturalized in the United States. Canda was charged with a crime in the United States and argued that he could not be convicted because he was not a citizen of the United States. The Supreme Court held that Canda could be convicted of the crime because he had been naturalized in the United States and was therefore a citizen of the United States. The Court reasoned that naturalization was a process by which a foreign-born person could become a citizen of the United States and that, once naturalized, the person was subject to the same laws and obligations as any other citizen. The Court also noted that the naturalization process was a voluntary act and that, by voluntarily becoming a citizen of the United States, Canda had accepted the obligations of citizenship, including the obligation to obey the laws of the United States. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that Canda could be convicted of the crime he was charged with because he had been naturalized in the United States and was therefore a citizen of the United States. The Court reasoned that naturalization was a voluntary act and that, by voluntarily becoming a citizen of the United States, Canda had accepted the obligations of citizenship, including the obligation to obey the laws of the United States.

Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in United States v. Canda, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that the government had no right to seize property from individuals without due process of law or just compensation for it, as required by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Furthermore, he noted that this case was not one where Congress had authorized such seizures; instead, it was done unilaterally by executive action. He concluded his dissent with a warning about allowing such actions: "The power thus assumed is dangerous and should be restricted within narrow limits." In short, Justice Harlan believed that while Congress may have certain powers over private property when necessary for public use or benefit (such as eminent domain), those powers must still be exercised according to constitutional requirements like due process and just compensation - something which did not happen in this case.