In the United States v. Frady case of 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant must demonstrate "cause" and "actual prejudice" to challenge a previously accepted guilty plea due to an error in jury instruction. The defendant, Leon Nelson Frady, was convicted for murder in 1963 and later filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) claiming that his conviction should be overturned because the trial judge had incorrectly instructed the jury on malice aforethought - an essential element of first-degree murder. However, he had not raised this issue at trial or on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that since Frady did not object during his original proceedings nor present any new evidence showing actual prejudice from these errors, he could not raise them now as grounds for relief.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Frady, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's decision to apply a "cause and prejudice" standard in cases where defendants fail to object at trial but later raise an issue on collateral review. He argued that this new standard was too harsh and would unfairly penalize defendants who may not have understood their rights or the potential consequences of failing to object during their original trials. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for creating this new rule without any guidance from Congress or precedent from previous court decisions. Instead of adopting such a strict approach, Justice Brennan suggested that courts should consider each case individually and decide whether it is fair to excuse a defendant’s procedural default based on its specific circumstances.