The United States Supreme Court case, United States v. Fruehauf et al., 1960, revolved around the interpretation of Section 346(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The defendants were charged with conspiring to defraud the U.S government by manipulating corporate acquisitions and liquidations in order to evade taxes. They argued that their actions were legal under a literal reading of Section 346(a)(2). However, the prosecution contended that such an interpretation was against Congressional intent behind this law which aimed at preventing tax evasion through manipulation of corporate structures. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Fruehauf et al., stating that while Congress intended to prevent tax evasion, it did not intend for all transactions involving acquisition or liquidation to be automatically considered fraudulent if they resulted in some form of tax benefit for those involved.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Fruehauf et al., Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 2(c) of the Clayton Act. They argued that this section was designed to prevent price discrimination which might harm competition, not to protect individual competitors from any form of competitive injury. The dissenters believed that a broader reading would make it impossible for businesses to engage in normal competitive practices without risking violation of the law. Furthermore, they contended that there was no evidence presented at trial showing such discriminatory pricing had actually harmed competition as opposed to merely injuring a competitor; thus, they felt it inappropriate for Fruehauf and others involved in this case to be held criminally liable under Section 2(c).