In the United States v. Ginsber case of 1916, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter concerning naturalization and citizenship revocation. The defendant, Jacob Ginsberg, was an immigrant from Russia who had become a U.S citizen in 1908 but was later accused of obtaining his citizenship through fraudulent means by concealing his anarchist beliefs during the naturalization process. The government sought to revoke his citizenship under Section 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906 which allowed for denaturalization if it was procured illegally or by concealment of material facts or willful misrepresentation. However, Ginsberg argued that he did not hold these beliefs at the time he applied for citizenship and only developed them afterwards; thus they were irrelevant to his application process. Despite this argument, Justice McKenna delivered a unanimous decision stating that even though there may have been no explicit fraud committed during Ginsberg's application process for naturalization due to lack of evidence proving so conclusively; nevertheless because he subsequently became an anarchist after becoming a citizen - something incompatible with loyalty towards America - therefore it justified revoking his American nationality.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Ginsberg, Justice McKenna argued that the majority's decision was too broad in its interpretation of Congress' power to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause. He contended that while Congress does have extensive powers to regulate interstate commerce, it should not be able to use this authority as a means of controlling morality or personal behavior within individual states. In his view, allowing such an expansive reading of Congressional power would effectively eliminate any limits on federal jurisdiction and undermine state sovereignty. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's assertion that selling liquor constituted "commerce" in this context; instead, he saw it as a local activity subject to state regulation rather than federal control.