In the United States v. Goodwin case of 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that a prosecutor's decision to re-indict a defendant on more serious charges did not violate due process even if it appeared punitive for the defendant choosing not to plead guilty to lesser charges. The court held that unless there was clear evidence of actual vindictiveness against a defendant, an increase in prosecution severity could be justified by legitimate governmental interests such as public safety or resource allocation. In this particular case, Michael Goodwin had initially been charged with misdemeanor theft but after he refused a plea deal and requested trial by jury, prosecutors escalated his charge to felony robbery which carried significantly harsher penalties. He argued this violated his constitutional rights because it punished him for exercising his legal right to stand trial rather than accept guilt prematurely.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Goodwin, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision failed to adequately protect defendants from prosecutorial vindictiveness. He contended that a prosecutor’s discretion should not be absolute and unchecked; rather, it must be exercised within certain boundaries defined by constitutional principles of fairness and respect for individual rights. In this case, he believed there was an appearance of retaliation against Goodwin when new charges were filed after his request for a jury trial - which is his constitutional right - thus raising concerns about potential abuse of power by prosecutors. This could have chilling effects on other defendants who might fear exercising their own legal rights due to possible punitive responses from prosecutors. Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that such actions violated the Due Process Clause as they potentially deterred individuals from asserting their legal rights.