In the United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York et al., 1929, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a federal court could enforce an order issued by a state court to turn over assets held in another country. The case involved the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, which had been appointed as trustee for bonds issued by a Russian railroad company before Russia's Bolshevik Revolution. After the revolution, Russia nationalized all railroads and repudiated their debts, including those owed to bondholders represented by Guaranty Trust Co. The bondholders sued in New York State courts and won judgments against Russia; however, they were unable to collect because most Russian assets were outside U.S jurisdiction. They then discovered that some Russian gold was being held in Sweden and obtained an order from NY courts directing Guaranty Trust Co., as trustee for these bonds, to seize this gold on behalf of its beneficiaries (the bondholders). When it refused citing potential violation of international law or comity among nations if it did so without express authorization from Congress or Executive Branch - they sued again. The Supreme Court ruled that federal courts lacked authority under existing laws at that time to enforce such orders involving extraterritorial seizure of property based on state-court judgments.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Justice Holmes argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling allowing the U.S. government to recover interest on war risk insurance was incorrect. He contended that Congress did not intend for such interest payments when it enacted legislation related to war risk insurance during World War I. Instead, he believed that this law was designed solely to provide financial support and protection for soldiers and their families in times of conflict, rather than as a means for the government to generate revenue through interest payments from insurers like Guaranty Trust Company. Therefore, he disagreed with his colleagues' interpretation of Congressional intent and felt they were overstepping their judicial authority by effectively rewriting legislation from the bench.