In the United States v. Harriss et al., 1953, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946. This act required lobbyists to register with the Secretary of Senate and Clerk of House and regularly disclose their expenditures and contributions. The defendants, a group of lobbyists, argued that this violated their First Amendment rights to petition government officials without interference or penalty. They also claimed it was too vague in its definition for those who must comply with these regulations (i.e., what constitutes "lobbying"). However, the court ruled against them stating that Congress has authority under Constitution to regulate lobbying activities which are intended to influence legislation process directly; thus not violating any constitutional rights as long as it does not prevent citizens from freely expressing their views on matters concerning legislature or executive departments.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Harriss et al., Justice Hugo Black argued that the Lobbying Act was not unconstitutionally vague and did not infringe on First Amendment rights. He contended that lobbying is a legitimate activity, but it can also be used to manipulate public policy in ways that are detrimental to the common good. Therefore, he believed there should be regulations requiring lobbyists to disclose their activities and funding sources so as to prevent corruption or undue influence over lawmakers. Furthermore, he asserted that such disclosure requirements do not violate free speech rights because they merely require transparency rather than limiting what can be said or done by lobbyists. In his view, any potential vagueness in the law could have been clarified through judicial interpretation rather than striking down the entire statute.