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17-1672 UNITED STATES V. HAYMOND DECISION BELOW: 869 F .3d 1153 THE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED, AND WILLIAM D. LUNN, ESQ., OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT ANDRE R. HAYMOND. CERT. GRANTED 10/26/2018 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding "unconstitutional and unenforceable" the portions of 18 U.S.C. 3583(k) that required the district court to revoke respondent's ten-year term of supervised release, and to impose five years of reimprisonment, following its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child pornography. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 16-5156
In the United States v. Haymond case of 2018, Andre Ralph Haymond was found guilty of possessing child pornography and sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by ten years' supervised release. After his release, he was again accused of possessing child pornography which violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court revoked his original sentence and imposed an additional mandatory minimum five-year prison term without a jury trial based on these new allegations. However, this decision was appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that it violated Haymond's Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Haymond in a 5-4 decision stating that imposing an additional punishment for violating conditions set during supervised released must be determined by a jury beyond reasonable doubt rather than decided solely by judges using lower standards like preponderance evidence or clear convincing evidence as per Fifth and Sixth Amendments respectively.
In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Haymond, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, argued that the majority's decision was a significant departure from precedent. They contended that the case did not involve an entirely new crime but rather a revocation of supervised release based on violations of its conditions. The dissenters believed this to be part of the penalty for the original offense and thus within Congress’s authority to prescribe penalties without jury involvement. They also noted that juries are typically not involved in parole or probation decisions which they saw as analogous situations. Furthermore, they expressed concern about potential implications of this ruling on other aspects of sentencing law where judicial fact-finding is common practice.