In the United States v. Kahn et ux., 1973, Irving and Minnie Kahn were convicted of conducting illegal gambling operations across state lines. The evidence against them was obtained through a wiretap authorized by the Attorney General under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. However, only Mr. Kahn's conversations were initially approved for surveillance; Mrs. Kahn's involvement came to light later during the course of interception but without additional judicial approval specifically naming her as a person whose communications may be intercepted. The Supreme Court held that all conversations pertaining to illegal activities captured on an authorized wiretap are admissible in court, regardless if all parties involved had been named in original surveillance order or not - provided they occurred within its time frame and scope set by law enforcement authorities at outset based on probable cause shown before authorization was granted. This ruling reaffirmed government’s right to use electronic surveillance for investigating organized crime while also clarifying limits placed upon such practices by Congress via aforementioned act – namely requirement that every effort must be made to minimize interception of non-pertinent discussions along with those involving individuals not originally targeted.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Kahn et ux., Justice Douglas argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established Fourth Amendment principles, which protect individuals' privacy rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. He contended that wiretapping is an intrusive method of surveillance and should be subjected to strict scrutiny under the law. In this case, he believed that Mrs. Kahn had not been named in the original wiretap order but her conversations were intercepted nonetheless, violating her constitutional rights as she did not consent to being surveilled nor was there probable cause to do so. Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on "misleading" language in Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Act suggesting spouses share a single expectation of privacy when it comes to communication interception by authorities without individualized suspicion or warrant naming them specifically.