In the case of United States v. Korpan, 1956, the Supreme Court examined whether a defendant could be convicted for refusing to answer questions before a grand jury about his possible involvement in criminal activities due to fear of self-incrimination. The defendant, Mr. Korpan, was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury investigating potential violations of gambling laws and refused to testify on grounds that it might incriminate him under state law. He was subsequently held in contempt and sentenced to imprisonment until he agreed to testify or until the term of the grand jury expired. The Supreme Court ruled against Mr. Korpan stating that Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination do not extend universally across all jurisdictions - they only apply where there is real danger of legal repercussions within federal jurisdiction itself from such testimony being given; thus if one cannot be prosecuted federally for an offense then one cannot refuse on these grounds alone from testifying about it at federal level even though such testimony may potentially incriminate oneself under state law.

The dissenting opinion in the United States v. Korpan case argued that the majority's decision to uphold a conviction for failure to report for induction into military service was flawed. The dissent emphasized that Korpan had not been properly informed of his rights and obligations under Selective Service law, particularly regarding his right to appeal a reclassification by his local draft board. It was also noted that he had not received adequate counsel during proceedings before the Appeal Board, which resulted in an unfair process against him. Furthermore, it was pointed out that there were inconsistencies between different sections of Selective Service regulations concerning appeals procedures and time limits, leading to confusion about what rules applied in this case. Therefore, according to the dissenting view, these procedural errors should have led to overturning Korpan's conviction rather than affirming it.