In the United States v. David W. Lanier case of 1996, the U.S Supreme Court addressed whether a criminal statute that prohibits deprivation of rights under color of law was applicable to acts committed by state officials in their official capacity. The defendant, David W. Lanier, was a Tennessee state judge who had been convicted for sexually assaulting several women in his judicial chambers and sentenced under this federal law (18 U.S.C §242). However, he appealed on grounds that his conduct did not constitute a violation because there were no clear standards defining sexual assault as unconstitutional at the time he committed these acts. The Supreme Court unanimously overturned Lanier's conviction stating that due process requires fair notice about what conduct is prohibited before punishment can be imposed; hence it would be unfair to convict him without prior explicit warning from any decisional law or statutory provision declaring such behavior illegal and punishable by federal statute. This ruling clarified an important aspect regarding interpretation and application of civil rights laws against public officials.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. David W. Lanier, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's decision to uphold Lanier's conviction under 18 U.S.C §242 was flawed because it relied on a broad interpretation of "constitutional rights" not clearly defined by Congress in the statute. He contended that this approach could lead to arbitrary and unpredictable enforcement of criminal law, as individuals would be left uncertain about what specific actions might violate vaguely-defined constitutional rights. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for retroactively applying new interpretations of §242 to past conduct—a violation of ex post facto principles—since at the time of his offenses, no clear precedent existed suggesting that sexual assault violated due process rights under §242. Thus, according to Scalia’s view, Lanier did not have fair warning his conduct was illegal.