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In the United States v. MacDonald, 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that a delay between indictment and arrest did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The case involved Jeffrey R. MacDonald, an Army officer accused of murdering his wife and children in 1970 but was not indicted until 1975 due to ongoing investigations by both military and civilian authorities. He argued that this five-year gap violated his constitutional rights as it hindered his ability to prepare an adequate defense due to fading memories and loss of evidence over time. However, the court held that these rights only apply after formal charges have been filed or proceedings have begun against a defendant; thus they were not applicable during pre-charge delays such as in MacDonald's case.
In the dissenting opinion for United States v. MacDonald, Justice William Brennan disagreed with the majority's view that a defendant cannot assert his right to a speedy trial before he is formally indicted. He argued that this interpretation of the Sixth Amendment was too narrow and did not adequately protect defendants from undue delay in prosecution. Brennan contended that such delays could significantly harm a defendant’s ability to mount an effective defense due to fading memories or loss of evidence over time. Furthermore, he pointed out that pre-indictment delays also cause anxiety and concern for accused individuals who are aware they may be charged but do not know when it will happen. Therefore, according to Brennan's dissenting opinion, the right to a speedy trial should apply as soon as an individual becomes the target of formal criminal proceedings.