United States v. McLaughlin was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a federal statute that prohibited the sale of liquor on Indian reservations was constitutional. The Court held that the statute was constitutional, and that Congress had the power to regulate the sale of liquor on Indian reservations. The case arose when McLaughlin, a non-Indian, was charged with selling liquor on an Indian reservation in violation of a federal statute. McLaughlin argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. The Court rejected this argument, holding that Congress had the power to regulate the sale of liquor on Indian reservations, and that the statute was a valid exercise of that power. The Court also held that the statute did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, as McLaughlin had argued. The Court reasoned that the statute was a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, and that it was not an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of that power. In conclusion, the Court held that the federal statute prohibiting the sale of liquor on Indian reservations was constitutional, and that Congress had the power to regulate the sale of liquor on Indian reservations. The Court also held that the statute did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

In United States v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a federal statute that prohibited the sale of liquor on Indian reservations was constitutional. The majority opinion held that Congress had authority to pass such legislation under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among states. Justice Field dissented from this ruling, arguing that Congress did not have the right to interfere in matters concerning Indians living on their own lands as they were “a separate people” who should be allowed autonomy over their own affairs. He further argued that while Congress could certainly make laws regulating trade between non-Indians and Indians, it could not impose restrictions upon internal tribal activities which would limit or destroy tribal self-government without violating fundamental principles of justice and morality.