In the United States v. Michel case of 1930, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter involving customs duties and importation laws. The defendant, Michel, was charged with smuggling goods into the country without paying required customs duties. He argued that he had not violated any law because his actions were in accordance with an executive order issued by President Wilson during World War I which allowed for duty-free importation of certain items from Europe to aid war-torn countries. The court disagreed with Michel's interpretation of this executive order. It held that such orders are subject to change or revocation at any time and do not supersede existing legislation unless explicitly stated otherwise; therefore, they cannot be used as a defense against charges brought under those laws. Furthermore, it found that even if the executive order could have provided some legal cover for Michel's actions when it was first issued (which was doubtful), it certainly did not by 1922 when he imported these goods since President Harding had already revoked all wartime trade regulations two years earlier in 1920. Thus, despite his claims to contrary effect based on misunderstood presidential authority and outdated policies no longer in force at relevant times here involved - Mr .Michel still stood guilty as charged under applicable U.S custom laws then currently governing such matters.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Michel, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence was flawed. The dissenting justices believed that there were significant doubts about whether or not Michel had actually committed the crime he was accused of - smuggling alcohol into the country during Prohibition. They pointed out inconsistencies in witness testimonies and noted that no direct evidence linking Michel to any illegal activities had been presented at trial. Furthermore, they criticized their colleagues' interpretation of certain laws related to customs duties and importation regulations, arguing these should not be applied so broadly as to criminalize actions which may have been innocent or unintentional. In conclusion, they felt this case represented an overreach by law enforcement authorities and a failure by courts to protect individuals from wrongful convictions.