In the United States v. Norris case of 1936, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter involving labor rights and anti-trust laws. The defendant, Mr. Norris, was charged with conspiring to restrain trade by coercing employees not to join or remain in a union under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act - an act typically applied to businesses rather than individuals. The court held that such application of this law was inappropriate as it did not apply to labor disputes between employers and employees but rather monopolistic business practices intended to limit competition in commerce or trade. Therefore, Mr. Norris's conviction for conspiracy under the Sherman Act was overturned because his actions were deemed unrelated to interstate commerce or trade restraint but instead related solely within employment relationships.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Norris, Justice Cardozo disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act. He argued that it was not intended to criminalize every act or agreement that might restrict competition in some way but rather only those acts which have a direct and substantial effect on commerce. In his view, this would include price-fixing agreements between competitors but not necessarily other types of arrangements such as exclusive dealing contracts or territorial restrictions imposed by manufacturers on their distributors. Furthermore, he contended that even if an act does fall within the scope of Section 2, it should still be subject to a rule-of-reason analysis to determine whether it is actually anticompetitive in nature and effect.