United States v. Northway was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a defendant could be convicted of a crime if the evidence presented at trial was obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The Court held that the evidence was admissible and that the defendant could be convicted. The case involved a defendant, Northway, who was charged with the illegal possession of firearms. The police had conducted a search of Northway's home without a warrant and had seized the firearms. Northway argued that the evidence should be excluded because it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The Court disagreed, holding that the evidence was admissible and that the defendant could be convicted. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence, was not applicable in this case because the police had acted in good faith and had not acted with any malicious intent. The Court also noted that the exclusionary rule was intended to deter police misconduct, not to punish innocent individuals. In conclusion, the Court held that the evidence obtained through the illegal search and seizure was admissible and that the defendant could be convicted. The Court's decision established that the exclusionary rule does not apply in cases where the police have acted in good faith and without malicious intent.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in United States v. Northway, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both law and justice. He argued that Congress had not intended for a person who has been pardoned of an offense to be liable for costs associated with their prosecution, as this would render the pardon meaningless. Furthermore, he noted that if Congress had intended such a result it should have explicitly stated so in its legislation rather than leaving it open to interpretation by courts. Additionally, Justice Field argued that since there was no legal authority requiring payment of costs after a pardon is granted then any attempt by the court to do so would be an act of judicial usurpation and therefore unconstitutional. Finally, he concluded his dissent by noting how unjust it would be for someone who has already suffered punishment due to their conviction but later received clemency from the President only then face additional financial penalties imposed by a court without any statutory basis or precedent.