In the United States v. Ojeda Rios et al., 1989, the Supreme Court examined whether evidence obtained from wiretaps should be suppressed because of delayed notice to those being surveilled. The FBI had conducted surveillance on Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and other suspects for their alleged involvement in a robbery conspiracy linked to a Puerto Rican nationalist group. However, they did not provide immediate notification after ceasing surveillance as required by law but waited three years before doing so. The defendants argued that this delay violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court initially agreed with the defendants, suppressing the wiretap evidence due to delayed notice. But upon appeal, both Circuit Courts reversed this decision stating that suppression was not an appropriate remedy for such violation unless it resulted in prejudice towards defendants' ability to defend themselves which wasn't proven here. However, when brought before the Supreme Court, it held that lower courts erred in determining if there was any prejudice caused by delayed notice without first deciding whether such delay indeed constituted a statutory violation or not under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III). Therefore, it remanded case back for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

In the dissenting opinion for UNITED STATES v. OJEDA RIOS et al., Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, argued that the majority's decision to allow a delay in serving search warrants violated Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. They contended that immediate execution of a warrant is an essential safeguard against potential abuses of power by law enforcement officials. The dissenters also expressed concern about allowing officers to decide when it would be "reasonable" to delay service of a warrant, arguing this could lead to arbitrary or discriminatory practices. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's assertion that surveillance did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; instead asserting any intrusion into privacy should be considered as such. Finally, they criticized the Court for failing to provide clear guidance on what constitutes an acceptable delay in executing search warrants.