The United States v. Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Company case in 1899 revolved around a dispute over the interpretation of tariff laws. The Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Company imported iron from Sweden and was charged with a duty under the Tariff Act of 1894, which imposed duties on "iron in pigs." The company argued that their import should be classified as "scrap iron" instead, which would result in lower duties. However, the Supreme Court ruled against them stating that even though it may have been scrap to some extent due to its form or condition at the time of importation, it still retained its essential character as pig iron and thus fell within that category for purposes of customs duty. Therefore, they were liable for paying higher tariffs under this classification.

The dissenting opinion in the United States v. Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Company case argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings and interpretations of the law. The dissent contended that, under existing laws, a corporation could not be held liable for an individual employee's actions unless it could be proven that those actions were directly authorized or sanctioned by the company itself. It further asserted that there was insufficient evidence to prove such authorization or sanctioning in this particular case. Therefore, according to this viewpoint, holding Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Company responsible for its employee’s alleged fraudulent activities represented a significant departure from established legal principles and set a dangerous precedent for future cases involving corporate liability.