In the United States v. Salisbury case of 1894, the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving land patents and mining claims in Colorado. The defendant, Salisbury, had obtained a patent for his claim from the U.S government but was later sued by another party who claimed to have discovered valuable minerals on the same land before Salisbury's patent was issued. The plaintiff argued that under federal law at that time (the Mining Act of 1872), discovery of such minerals gave him superior rights to those lands over any subsequent patent holder. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument and upheld Salisbury's rights as a patent holder. It clarified that while discovery of mineral deposits could indeed establish property rights under certain circumstances, it did not automatically supersede or nullify existing patents granted by the government unless there were clear indications that these discoveries were made prior to issuing said patents. This ruling affirmed an important principle regarding property rights in American jurisprudence: namely, once granted by competent authority (in this case, through issuance of a valid land patent), they cannot be arbitrarily overturned without compelling evidence or due process.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Salisbury, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold Salisbury's conviction on charges of embezzlement from a national bank was incorrect. The dissenting justices believed that there were significant issues with how evidence had been presented and interpreted during the trial. They contended that certain pieces of evidence should not have been admitted due to their questionable relevance and potential prejudicial effect on jurors' perceptions of Salisbury's character and guilt. Furthermore, they disagreed with the interpretation of banking laws used by prosecutors to charge Salisbury with embezzlement in this case, arguing instead for a narrower reading which would exclude his actions from being considered criminal under these statutes. In essence, they felt that while his actions may have been ethically dubious or even civilly actionable, they did not constitute federal crimes as charged.