In the United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1966 case, the Supreme Court ruled that Sealy's licensing agreements violated antitrust laws by restricting competition and creating a monopoly in certain markets. The court found that these practices were not justified under any of the recognized exceptions to Sherman Act prohibitions against restraints on trade. Sealy was a corporation owned by twenty-seven licensees who manufactured bedding products under its brand name across different territories in America. Each licensee had exclusive rights within their territory and agreed not to sell outside it or compete with other members' territories - an arrangement which effectively divided up national market into regional monopolies for each member company. The court held this as illegal price fixing and territorial allocation, rejecting arguments from Sealy that they were merely exercising reasonable control over their trademarked product.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Sealy, Inc., Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision to find Sealy guilty of violating antitrust laws was based on a misinterpretation of those laws. He contended that there was no evidence to suggest that Sealy had conspired with its licensees to fix prices or divide markets, which are necessary elements for proving an antitrust violation. Instead, he believed that the company's licensing agreements were simply part of a legitimate business strategy aimed at promoting brand uniformity and quality control across different regions. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for failing to consider whether these arrangements actually had any anti-competitive effects in their respective markets before ruling against them. In his view, this lack of analysis undermined both legal precedent and economic logic.