In the United States v. Stapf et al., Executors and Trustees, 1963 case, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a federal estate tax lien could be enforced against property transferred by a decedent prior to his death. The decedent had transferred assets into an irrevocable trust for his wife's benefit during his lifetime but retained certain powers over it until he died. After his death, the IRS sought to collect unpaid taxes from this trust. The executors of the estate argued that since these transfers were made while he was alive and not part of his will or testamentary transfer, they should not be subject to federal estate tax liens. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument and held that even though these transfers were made during life rather than at death, they still fell within Section 827(b) of Internal Revenue Code which provides for inclusion in gross estates those interests over which decedents have possessed power at time of their deaths exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any person without regard as to when or from what source such power is obtained. This decision clarified that certain types of trusts can indeed be included in gross estates for purposes of calculating federal estate taxes if there are specific conditions met regarding control over said trusts up until time of death.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Stapf et al., Executors and Trustees, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision to deny tax exemption status to a trust fund established by a deceased woman for her son was incorrect. He contended that the majority had misinterpreted Section 812(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which provides an estate tax marital deduction for property passing from a decedent to his or her surviving spouse. According to Justice Harlan, this provision should apply even if there is an intervening life interest in someone other than the surviving spouse (in this case, their son). The justice believed that as long as it could be reasonably expected that all or part of the property would eventually pass on to the surviving spouse without being consumed by other beneficiaries during their lifetime interests, then such property should qualify for marital deduction under Section 812(b). Therefore, he disagreed with denying tax benefits based on speculative possibilities about future events affecting how much property might ultimately reach its intended beneficiary.