In United States v. Stone, the Supreme Court held that a federal statute allowing for the seizure of vessels engaged in illegal trading with an enemy nation was constitutional. The case arose when John S. Stone attempted to export cotton from New Orleans during the Civil War without obtaining a license from the Secretary of Treasury as required by law. The government seized his vessel and cargo, prompting him to file suit against them claiming that such seizures were unconstitutional under Article I Section 8 Clause 10 of the Constitution which grants Congress power “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas” but does not explicitly grant authority over trade between citizens and foreign nations at war with each other or their allies. However, Chief Justice Salmon P Chase wrote for a unanimous court that Congress had implied powers beyond those enumerated in Article I Section 8 Clause 10 which allowed it to pass statutes regulating commerce with enemies during wartime even if they did not involve piracy or felonies on open seas; thus affirming its right to seize vessels engaging in illegal trading activities without violating any Constitutional provisions.

In United States v. Stone, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a federal statute that allowed for the seizure of property used in violation of customs laws applied to vessels owned by Confederate citizens during the Civil War. The majority opinion held that it did, finding that Congress had authority under its war powers to pass such a law and enforce it against those who violated U.S. neutrality laws or aided enemies of the Union during wartime. Justice Field dissented from this decision on two grounds: first, he argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact such legislation; second, he contended that even if they did have such power, it should not be extended retroactively so as to apply in cases where violations occurred prior to passage of the law itself. He further noted his belief that allowing seizures would violate principles enshrined in both international and domestic law regarding private property rights and due process protections afforded individuals accused of crimes or civil wrongs