In the United States v. Swift & Company case of 1930, the Supreme Court ruled that a consent decree entered into by parties in an antitrust suit was not necessarily final and could be modified if circumstances significantly changed or if it was no longer achieving its original purpose. The court held that federal courts have broad discretion to modify such decrees when they become "unworkable" due to unforeseen obstacles or are detrimental to public interests. This decision came about after Swift & Co., along with several other meat packers, sought relief from a 1920 consent decree which had restricted their business operations in order to prevent monopolistic practices. They argued that changes in industry conditions since the time of the decree justified its modification.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Swift & Company, Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision to uphold a consent decree against Swift and other meatpackers was inappropriate because it extended beyond what was necessary to prevent future violations of antitrust laws. He contended that while courts have broad powers in crafting remedies for past wrongs, they should not use this power to regulate business practices unrelated to those wrongs or impose restrictions on lawful activities. In his view, the court had overstepped its bounds by imposing conditions on how these companies could conduct their businesses moving forward - including prohibiting them from entering into certain types of contracts and requiring them to sell off some assets - even though these actions were not directly tied to any proven violation of law. Furthermore, he expressed concern about potential abuse of judicial authority if courts are allowed such wide latitude in shaping remedies without clear statutory guidance or limitations.