United States v. Teller was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a defendant could be convicted of a crime if the indictment was not returned within the time period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. The defendant, Teller, was indicted for a crime that was alleged to have been committed more than three years prior to the indictment. The defendant argued that the indictment was invalid because it was not returned within the three-year period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held that the indictment was valid and that the defendant could be convicted of the crime. The Court reasoned that the applicable statute of limitations was not a bar to the prosecution of the crime, but rather a limitation on the time within which the indictment must be returned. The Court further reasoned that the statute of limitations did not bar the prosecution of the crime, but rather provided a defense to the defendant that could be raised at trial. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the indictment was valid and that the defendant could be convicted of the crime, even though the indictment was returned more than three years after the crime was alleged to have been committed. The Court reasoned that the applicable statute of limitations was not a bar to the prosecution of the crime, but rather a limitation on the time within which the indictment must be returned.

In United States v. Teller, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a defendant who had been convicted of violating an act of Congress could be pardoned by the President after his conviction but before sentencing. The majority opinion held that such a pardon would be valid and effective in preventing any further proceedings against the defendant for that offense. Justice Field dissented from this ruling on two grounds: first, he argued that under Article II Section 2 of the Constitution, which grants power to grant reprieves and pardons "except in cases of impeachment," only offenses punishable by impeachment can be subject to presidential pardon; second, he argued that even if it were possible for a president to issue such a pardon prior to sentencing, it should not prevent courts from exercising their authority over criminal matters as provided by law.