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09-1498 UNITED STATES V. TINKLENBERG DECISION BELOW: 579 F.3d 589 JUSTICE KAGAN TOOK NO PART CERT. GRANTED 9/28/2010 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the time between the filing of a pretrial motion and its disposition is automatically excluded from the deadline for commencing trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(I)(D) (Supp. II 2008), or is instead excluded only if the motion actually causes a postponement, or the expectation of a postponement, of the trial. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-2646, 08-1765
In the case of United States v. Jason Louis Tinklenberg, the Supreme Court ruled on two issues related to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. The first issue was whether a pretrial motion automatically pauses (or "tolls") the Act's 70-day limit for starting trial, even if it does not actually cause a delay; and secondly, whether an excluded delay could occur when no actual delay resulted from defendant’s decision to file pretrial motions. Tinklenberg had been charged with possession of child pornography and being a felon in possession of firearms but his trial did not start until well after the stipulated 70 days due to various delays including psychiatric evaluations and hearings on suppression motions. He appealed his conviction arguing that these delays violated his right under this act. In its ruling, however, SCOTUS held that filing any pretrial motion stops clock regardless if it causes or is expected to cause necessary postponement leading up to trial date thereby affirming Sixth Circuit court's judgment against him.
In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Tinklenberg, Justice Scalia argued that the majority misinterpreted the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. He contended that a delay should only be excluded from consideration if it actually caused or was expected to cause a postponement of trial proceedings. In this case, he believed there was no evidence to suggest that pretrial motions and transportations had any impact on when Tinklenberg's trial would begin. Therefore, these delays should not have been excluded in calculating whether his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Furthermore, Scalia criticized the majority’s interpretation as overly broad and inconsistent with Congress’ intent when drafting the law.