In the case of United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court ruled that a criminal enterprise could be prosecuted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if it had no legitimate business operations. The defendant, Raymond J. Turkette, was charged with operating a criminal organization involved in arson-for-hire and drug trafficking activities. He argued that his group did not qualify as an "enterprise" under RICO because they were purely criminal and didn't engage in any legal businesses or affairs. However, the court disagreed with this interpretation of RICO's language; Justice Brennan wrote for majority stating that Congress intended to cover both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises when drafting RICO law to combat organized crime effectively.

In the dissenting opinion for United States v. Turkette, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority's interpretation of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) was overly broad and inconsistent with Congressional intent. He contended that Congress intended to use RICO to combat organized crime infiltrating legitimate businesses, not target illegitimate enterprises themselves. By extending its reach to wholly criminal organizations, he believed it would lead to prosecutorial overreach and potential misuse against groups not originally intended by Congress such as political protestors or social activists who may technically fall under this expanded definition of 'enterprise'. Furthermore, he expressed concern about the vagueness of defining a pattern of racketeering activity which could potentially result in arbitrary enforcement. In his view, these issues raised serious constitutional questions regarding due process rights.