United States v. Ulrici was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a defendant could be convicted of a crime if the evidence presented at trial was obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The Court held that the evidence was admissible and that the defendant could be convicted. The case arose when Ulrici was arrested for the possession of counterfeit coins. The arresting officers had obtained a search warrant for Ulrici's home, but the warrant was later found to be invalid. At trial, Ulrici argued that the evidence obtained from the search should be excluded because it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The trial court disagreed and allowed the evidence to be admitted. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the evidence was admissible and that Ulrici could be convicted. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence, was not applicable in this case because the officers had acted in good faith when obtaining the search warrant. The Court also noted that the exclusionary rule was intended to deter police misconduct, not to punish innocent officers. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the evidence obtained from the illegal search and seizure was admissible and that Ulrici could be convicted. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule was not applicable in this case because the officers had acted in good faith when obtaining the search warrant.

In United States v. Ulrici, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a contract between two parties could be enforced in court when one of the parties had died before it was executed. The majority opinion held that such contracts were not enforceable because they lacked consideration and mutuality of obligation. However, Justice Field dissented from this ruling, arguing that there should be an exception to this rule for cases involving deceased persons who had already partially performed their obligations under the contract prior to death. He argued that since these individuals had already provided some benefit or detriment as part of their agreement with another party, it would be unjust to deny them any legal recourse if something went wrong after their death. Furthermore, he noted that allowing such contracts would provide greater certainty and security for those entering into agreements with deceased persons than denying them altogether.