Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 30 Jun 2025

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that noncitizens on American soil are generally eligible for asylum if they qualify as a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (A). A refugee is someone with "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. § 1101(a)(42). Noncitizens are presumptively eligible for asylum if they have "suffered persecution in the past." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). If ordered removed by an immigration judge (IJ), noncitizens may appeal the removal order-and with it, the denial of asylum-to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). From there, "judicial review" is available in "an appropriate court of appeals." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The INA mandates judicial deference on "findings of fact" and three other kinds of administrative decisions. Id. § 1252(b)(4). The statute also explicitly provides for judicial review of the BIA's decisions on "questions of law," but does not establish a deferential standard of review for such decisions. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(9). The question presented is: Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA's judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute "persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

The case asked what standard of review applies when a court of appeals reviews the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that a set of undisputed facts amounts to persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Jackson, held that substantial-evidence review applies. It explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) makes agency factual findings conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise, and that the Court’s earlier decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, together with later statutory history, already treated the persecution determination as one reviewed deferentially. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument for de novo review, reasoning that the fact that persecution is a mixed question does not remove it from the statute’s deferential standard. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment.