Term: 2012
Docket: 11-556
Maetta Vance, Petitioner v. Ball State University
- Pro
11-556 VANCE V. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL. DECISION BELOW: 646 F3d 461 CERT. GRANTED 6/25/2012 QUESTION PRESENTED: In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), this Court held that under Title VII, an employer is vicariously liable for severe or pervasive workplace harassment by a supervisor of the victim. If the harasser was the victim's co-employee, however, the employer is not liable absent proof of negligence. In the decision below, the Seventh Circuit held that actionable harassment by a person whom the employer deemed a "supervisor" and who had the authority to direct and oversee the victim's daily work could not give rise to vicarious liability because the harasser did not also have the power to take formal employment actions against her. The question presented is: Whether, as the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held, the Faragher and Ellerth "supervisor" liability rule (i) applies to harassment by those whom the employer vests with authority to direct and oversee their victim's daily work, or, as the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held (ii) is limited to those harassers who have the power to "hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline" their victim. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 08-3568
In the case of Maetta Vance v. Ball State University, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on who qualifies as a "supervisor" in cases involving harassment at work under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The petitioner, Maetta Vance, an African-American woman employed by Ball State University's Banquet and Catering Department claimed she was subjected to racial discrimination and retaliation by her white colleagues whom she considered supervisors. However, these individuals did not have direct authority over her employment status (hiring or firing). The court held that for someone to be classified as a supervisor in such cases they must have power to take tangible employment actions against the victim like hiring, firing or promoting them; simply overseeing their daily tasks does not qualify them as supervisors under Title VII liability rules. This decision narrowed down who can be considered a 'supervisor' in workplace harassment suits thereby limiting employer’s vicarious liability.
In the dissenting opinion for Maetta Vance v. Ball State University, Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's decision to narrow the definition of a "supervisor" in workplace harassment cases was misguided and out of touch with modern employment realities. She contended that this ruling would leave many victims without effective protection against discrimination and harassment. The majority defined supervisors as those who have power to take tangible employment actions such as hiring, firing or promoting employees. However, Ginsburg pointed out that individuals can exercise significant control over another's daily work environment even if they lack authority to hire or fire them - these people should also be considered supervisors under Title VII law which prohibits workplace discrimination based on race, color, religion sex or national origin. Furthermore, she criticized the court for ignoring guidance from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which defines supervisor more broadly than just someone who has power to make tangible employment decisions.
