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10-1211 VARTELAS V. HOLDER DECISION BELOW: 620 F.3d 108 CERT. GRANTED 9/27/2011 QUESTION PRESENTED: Prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immi-gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), April 1, 1997, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13), provided: The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary. In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), this Court held that a lawful permanent resident ("LPR") who made an "innocent, casual, and brief" trip across an international border did not "intend" a "departure" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). However, effective April 1, 1997, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) repealed 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13). The amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) provides: (C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for the purpose of the immigration laws unless the alien, (v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), unless since offense the alien has been granted relief under section 212(h) or 240A(a). (Emphasis added) Two other Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (C)(v) cannot be retroactively applied to an alien who pled guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude prior to the effective date of IIRIRA. The question presented is: Should 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), which removes LPR of his right, under Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), to make "innocent, casual, and brief" trips abroad without fear that he will be denied reentry, be applied retroactively to a guilty plea taken prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 09-0649-ag
In the case of Panagis Vartelas v. Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General, 2011, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of Vartelas, a legal permanent resident who had been denied reentry into the United States after a brief trip abroad due to an old conviction for conspiracy to make counterfeit securities. The court held that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) could not be applied retroactively to deny admission based on convictions prior to its enactment in 1997. This decision was grounded on principles of statutory interpretation and constitutional avoidance which caution against applying laws retrospectively unless Congress has clearly indicated such intent. Therefore, Vartelas' short-term travel should have been governed by immigration law as it stood at his time of conviction rather than under IIRIRA's stricter rules.
In the dissenting opinion for Panagis Vartelas v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Justice Scalia argued that the majority misinterpreted immigration law and its retroactivity provisions. He contended that Congress intended to make changes in immigration law apply to all cases, regardless of when they occurred or were adjudicated. The majority's interpretation would create a two-tiered system where some immigrants are subject to different laws based on timing alone, which he believed was not what Congress intended with their legislation. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s reliance on an earlier case (Rosenberg v Fleuti) as precedent because it had been effectively overruled by subsequent legislation; thus should no longer be considered binding authority.