In the case of Virginia and Alabama Coal Company v. Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia, 1897, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a contract between two parties could be enforced if it violated state law. The dispute arose when the Virginia and Alabama Coal Company (VACC) entered into an agreement with Central Railroad to transport coal at a fixed rate for ten years. However, this contract contravened Georgia's laws which prohibited such long-term agreements in order to maintain competitive rates among railroads. When VACC sued for breach of contract after Central Railroad increased its rates before the agreed term had expired, lower courts ruled in favor of VACC on grounds that federal commerce laws superseded state regulations. The Supreme Court reversed these decisions stating that while interstate commerce is indeed under federal jurisdiction as per Constitution’s Commerce Clause; private contracts like those between VACC and Central Railroad are subject to local law unless they directly interfere with congressional regulation or policy regarding interstate trade - which wasn't proven here. Therefore, since their agreement violated Georgia's anti-competition statutes designed to protect public interest by preventing monopolistic practices within railroad industry; it couldn't be legally upheld.

In the dissenting opinion for Virginia and Alabama Coal Company v. Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia, it was argued that the majority's decision failed to properly consider the rights of private property owners. The dissenting justices believed that a railroad company should not have unrestricted power to condemn land for its own use without considering whether this action is necessary or beneficial to public interest. They contended that such an approach could lead to abuse by powerful corporations at the expense of individual citizens' rights. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's interpretation of 'public use,' arguing instead for a narrower definition which would limit companies' ability to seize land under eminent domain laws unless there was clear evidence showing necessity and benefitting public welfare.