In the case of Virginian Railway Company v. United States et al., 1926, the Supreme Court ruled on whether a railway company could be compelled to provide switching services for another railroad under Section 3(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Virginian Railway Company refused to switch cars from its line onto that of Norfolk and Western Railway at Sewell's Point, Virginia. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered them to do so but they resisted arguing it was not a common point between their lines and thus outside ICC’s jurisdiction. However, in an unanimous decision by Justice Willis Van Devanter, the court upheld ICC's order stating that while Sewell’s Point wasn’t technically a junction or interchange point as traditionally understood in railroading terms; it was within reasonable proximity for such operations considering modern technology advancements which made short hauls feasible without undue burden on carrier companies like Virginian Railways.

In the dissenting opinion for Virginian Railway Company v. United States, Justice McReynolds argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had overstepped its authority by ordering a reduction in rates without sufficient evidence of unreasonableness or discrimination. He contended that there was no substantial proof to support the ICC's decision and emphasized that courts should not blindly accept administrative determinations without thorough examination. Furthermore, he expressed concern about potential harm to railway companies due to arbitrary rate reductions which could undermine their financial stability and ability to provide necessary services. The justice believed it was essential for courts to ensure regulatory bodies like ICC did not abuse their powers at the expense of private entities' rights and interests.