This case was a dispute between the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company and the state of Illinois. The railway company argued that the state of Illinois had violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by passing a law that prohibited the railway company from charging more for a longer distance than a shorter distance. The railway company argued that this law interfered with interstate commerce and was therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railway company, finding that the law did indeed violate the Commerce Clause. The Court held that the law interfered with the railway company's right to freely engage in interstate commerce, and that the state of Illinois had no authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Court also held that the law was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, and that the state of Illinois had no power to regulate the rates charged by the railway company. The Court's decision in this case was significant because it established the principle that states cannot interfere with interstate commerce. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and it has been used to protect the rights of businesses to engage in interstate commerce without interference from the states.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both precedent and reason. He argued that Congress had exclusive power over interstate commerce, which included railroads operating between states; therefore any state laws attempting to regulate such commerce were unconstitutional under Article I of the Constitution. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that if a state could impose its own regulations on an interstate railroad it would create chaos as each state would have different rules for how they should be operated within their borders. This would lead to confusion among passengers and freight companies who must comply with multiple sets of regulations when crossing from one state into another - something he believed was not intended by either Congress or the framers of the Constitution when they granted exclusive authority over interstate commerce to Congress alone. In conclusion, Justice Field argued that allowing states to regulate intrastate railroads while denying them authority over those engaged in interstate business violated both precedent and logic; thus he dissented from his colleagues' ruling in this case