Term: 2008
Docket: 07-772
Doug Waddington, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center v. Cesar Sarausad
- Pro
07-772 WADDINGTON V. SARAUSAD DECISION BELOW: 479 F3d 671 CERT. GRANTED 3/17/2008 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly approved of the pattern accomplice liability jury instructions given in Sarausad’s trial, which mirror the statutory language on accomplice liability under state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found a violation of due process based its independent conclusion that the instructions were ambiguous, and that there was a reasonable likelihood a jury could misapply the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 1. In reviewing a due process challenge to jury instructions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, must the federal courts accept the state court determination that the instructions fully and correctly set out state law governing accomplice liability? 2. Where the accomplice liability instructions correctly set forth state law, is it an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law to conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving all the elements of the crime? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-35062
In the case of Doug Waddington, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center v. Cesar Sarausad in 2008, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on issues related to accomplice liability and jury instructions. The defendant, Cesar Sarausad was convicted for his role as a driver in a drive-by shooting that resulted in one death and another injury. He appealed his conviction arguing that he did not know about the shooter's intent to kill or harm anyone when he drove him to the scene of crime. His appeal focused on whether jury instructions were clear enough regarding what knowledge is necessary for an accomplice’s culpability under state law; specifically if it required proof that he knew of his principal's criminal intent. The Supreme Court held by a vote of six-to-three that there was no reasonable likelihood jurors interpreted instructions from trial court incorrectly with respect to federal due process standards. Therefore they upheld Sarausad’s conviction stating that even though he may not have known about specific intentions behind actions taken by others involved in crime, being aware of general criminal activity sufficed for guilt under Washington State Law.
In the dissenting opinion for Waddington v. Sarausad, Justice Souter argued that the majority's decision to overturn a Ninth Circuit ruling was incorrect because it failed to consider whether or not the jury instructions in question were ambiguous. He believed that ambiguity existed and could have led jurors to believe they could convict on an accomplice liability theory even if they thought Sarausad did not know his compatriot intended to use a gun. The justice also disagreed with the majority’s application of harmless-error review, arguing instead that there was reasonable doubt about whether Sarausad would have been convicted without this error given evidence suggesting he may not have known about his friend's intent to shoot. Therefore, according to Justice Souter, this case should be remanded back down for further consideration rather than outright reversal.
