In the case of Wall v. Cox in 1900, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership. The plaintiff, Wall, claimed that he had purchased a tract of land from an individual who had obtained it through inheritance from his father's estate. However, the defendant, Cox, argued that he was entitled to this property as per an earlier agreement made between him and the original owner before his death. The lower court ruled in favor of Cox based on evidence presented regarding this prior agreement. The Supreme Court reversed this decision upon appeal by Wall stating that such agreements are not legally binding unless they have been officially recorded or there is substantial proof demonstrating their existence beyond any reasonable doubt which was lacking in this case. Furthermore, since no formal record existed for such deal and given its nature being more like a personal promise rather than a legal contract; it could not supersede subsequent legitimate transactions involving said property including its transfer via inheritance and sale to another party i.e., Mr.Wall. Therefore according to law as interpreted by US supreme court here; Mr.Cox’s claim lacked merit while Mr.Wall’s purchase stood valid making him rightful owner of disputed land.

The dissenting opinion in the case of WALL v. COX, 1900, argued that the majority's decision was incorrect because it failed to recognize a crucial distinction between different types of property rights. The dissent contended that while an individual may have absolute ownership over physical property such as land or goods, intellectual property like patents and copyrights are inherently limited by their nature and purpose. These rights exist not for the sole benefit of their holders but also serve public interests such as promoting innovation and creativity. Therefore, they should be subject to certain restrictions which do not apply to other forms of property. The dissent further criticized the majority for ignoring this fundamental difference in its ruling, thereby undermining both legal precedent and sound policy considerations.