In Warfield v. Chaffe et al., the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The petitioner, Warfield, was a prisoner in the custody of the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia. He had been convicted of a crime in the District of Columbia and was serving a sentence in the federal penitentiary. Warfield sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court of the District of Columbia, claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional. The United States Marshal refused to obey the writ, and the state court then issued a writ of attachment against the Marshal. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the power to issue writs of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison persons convicted of federal crimes. The Court also held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of attachment against the United States Marshal. The Court reasoned that the power to issue writs of attachment was also a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to enforce its laws.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Warfield v. Chaffe et al., arguing that the majority had erred in its interpretation of a Louisiana statute concerning inheritance rights. The statute provided that, if an individual died without leaving any children or grandchildren, their siblings would be entitled to inherit their estate; however, if they left behind only nieces and nephews (children of siblings), then those nieces and nephews were not eligible for inheritance. In this case, it was argued that since the deceased had no living children or grandchildren but did have surviving nieces and nephews who were also his great-nieces and great-nephews (the children of his deceased brother's son), these individuals should still be considered "children" under the terms of the statute. Justice Field disagreed with this interpretation on two grounds: firstly because he believed there was nothing within either common law or statutory law which supported such an expansive definition; secondly because he felt it would lead to absurd results whereby distant relatives could claim rights over more immediate ones simply by virtue of being further removed from a common ancestor - something which ran contrary to both legal precedent as well as basic principles of justice. Ultimately therefore Justice Field concluded that while sympathy may dictate otherwise, strictly speaking under existing laws only direct descendants are legally entitled to inherit property upon death - meaning in this instance none other than those related through bloodline rather than marriage alone could do so.