Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company v. District of Columbia was a Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of taxation. The District of Columbia had imposed a tax on the Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company, which the company argued was unconstitutional. The company argued that the tax was a violation of the Fifth Amendment, which states that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the District of Columbia. The Court held that the tax was not a taking of private property, but rather a legitimate exercise of the District's power to tax. The Court reasoned that the tax was not a taking because it did not deprive the company of its property, but rather imposed a burden on the company's use of the property. The Court also noted that the tax was not excessive, and that it was imposed in a manner consistent with the District's power to tax. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia had the power to impose a tax on the Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company, and that the tax was not a taking of private property. The Court's decision established the principle that the District of Columbia has the power to tax private property, so long as the tax is not excessive and is imposed in a manner consistent with the District's power to tax.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company v. District of Columbia, arguing that the Court should not have granted a writ of mandamus to compel the District of Columbia to issue bonds for construction costs incurred by the railroad company. He argued that Congress had never authorized such an action, nor did it provide any means for enforcing its terms. Furthermore, he noted that if this decision was allowed to stand then other companies could use similar tactics against local governments without congressional authorization or oversight. He concluded his dissent by noting that while Congress may have intended to benefit private corporations with its legislation, it had no authority under Article I Section 8 Clause 17 of the Constitution (the Taxing and Spending Clause) to grant special privileges or immunities on behalf of those entities at public expense without due process protections being provided first.