Term: 2016
Docket: 16-240
Weaver v. Massachusetts
- Pro
16-240 WEAVER V. MASSACHUSETTS DECISION BELOW: 54 N.E.3d 495 CERT. GRANTED 1/13/2017 QUESTION PRESENTED: Because "most constitutional errors can be harmless," this Court has "adopted the general rule that a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a [criminal] conviction" and instead is subject to a "harmless-error analysis." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991). Among the constitutional violations subject to such analysis is ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). At the same time, the Court has identified a category of "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless- error' standards." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309. The consequences of such errors are "necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate" and are therefore not susceptible to a harmless-error inquiry. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1993). The question presented is whether a defendant asserting ineffective assistance that results in a structural error must, in addition to demonstrating deficient performance, show that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness, as held by four circuits and five state courts of last resort; or whether prejudice is presumed in such cases, as held by four other circuits and two state high courts. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: SJC-10932
In the case of Weaver v. Massachusetts, 2016, Kentel Myrone Weaver argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the public was excluded from two days of jury selection during his murder trial in a state court. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not object to this closure at the time. The Supreme Court ruled against him on both counts. They held that even if there had been a violation due to courtroom closure, he failed to demonstrate prejudice as required by precedent for structural errors (errors affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds). On ineffective assistance claim, they found it unnecessary to determine whether counsel's performance was deficient since any alleged error did not affect outcome given lack of demonstrated prejudice.
In the dissenting opinion for Weaver v. Massachusetts, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, argued that a defendant's right to a public trial is not merely structural but also fundamental and personal in nature. They contended that Kentel Weaver was denied this right when his family and friends were excluded from the courtroom during jury selection due to space constraints. The dissenting justices disagreed with the majority's view that any violation of this right did not prejudice Weaver or affect his trial’s outcome because he failed to demonstrate specific harm or prove an overall unfair process. Instead, they asserted that such violations inherently result in "basic unfairness," which should be enough to warrant relief without requiring proof of additional negative consequences on the trial itself.
