In the case of Weinstein et al. v. Bradford, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in 1975 that a parolee's claim against his parole board was moot because he had been released from prison and was no longer under their jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Bradford, filed a lawsuit alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by the North Carolina Parole Board when they denied him parole without providing reasons for their decision or allowing him to respond to any allegations made against him during his hearing. However, by the time this case reached the Supreme Court, Bradford had already been unconditionally released from prison and thus was not subject to supervision or control by the Parole Board anymore. Therefore, there wasn't an ongoing controversy for which relief could be granted making it impossible for courts to provide meaningful remedy even if they found in favor of Bradford.

In the dissenting opinion for Weinstein et al. v. Bradford, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the case should not have been dismissed as moot because it raised important issues about parole procedures that were capable of repetition yet evading review. He contended that even though Bradford had been released on parole, his claim was still relevant because he could be returned to prison and subjected to the same allegedly unconstitutional procedures again if his parole was revoked in future. Furthermore, Douglas pointed out that other prisoners would likely face similar situations but their cases might never reach final judicial resolution due to the length of time required for litigation compared with typical duration of imprisonment or parole periods.