Term: 2015
Docket: 15-6418
Welch v. United States
- Pro
15-6418 WELCH V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 14-15733 order ORDER OF JANUARY 15, 2016: HELGI C. WALKER, ESQ., OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. CERT. GRANTED 1/8/2016 QUESTION PRESENTED: I. Whether the District Court was in error when it denied relief on Petitioner's §2255 motion to vacate, which alleged that a prior Florida conviction for "sudden snatching,' did not qualify for ACCA enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §924(e). II. Whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review. Furthermore, Petitioner ask this Court to resolve the Circuit split which has developed on the question of Johnson retroactivity in the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 14-15733
In Welch v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that its previous decision in Johnson v. United States (2015), which held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague, should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of unlawful firearm possession who have three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. The residual clause had been used to define what crimes constituted a "violent felony." Gregory Welch had been sentenced under this clause and sought to have his sentence reduced after the Johnson ruling invalidated it as too vague. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the court found in favor of Welch with a 7-1 majority.
In the dissenting opinion for Welch v. United States, Justice Thomas argued that the court's decision to apply a new rule retroactively was incorrect and inconsistent with previous rulings. He believed that this case did not meet the criteria set by Teague v. Lane, which states that new rules should only be applied retroactively if they alter our understanding of bedrock procedural elements or implicate fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings. According to him, Johnson’s vagueness ruling neither altered any such element nor implicated fundamental fairness or accuracy but merely prohibited a certain type of punishment – an enhancement based on possessing a firearm in connection with crimes of violence or drug trafficking offenses - because it found the definition too vague. Therefore, he concluded that it was not substantive as per Teague’s framework and hence shouldn't have been made retroactive.
