In the case of West Virginia ex rel. Dyer et al. v. Sims, State Auditor in 1950, the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute over an interstate compact between Ohio and West Virginia regarding fishing rights in their shared river waters. The plaintiffs argued that this agreement was unconstitutional because it had not been ratified by both states' legislatures and approved by Congress as required under Article I, Section 10 of the U.S Constitution for any agreement or compact made between two or more states. However, the court held that while Congressional consent is necessary for such compacts to be valid under federal law, it does not necessarily have to precede them; rather it can be given after they are entered into by the concerned states. Furthermore, whether a particular state's internal procedures were followed correctly when entering into such agreements is primarily a matter for that state's courts to decide upon. The court thus upheld the validity of this interstate compact despite its lack of prior approval from Congress and dismissed claims about procedural irregularities within West Virginia’s legislature as being outside its jurisdiction.

In the dissenting opinion for West Virginia ex rel. Dyer et al. v. Sims, State Auditor, Justice Robert H. Jackson disagreed with the majority's decision to abstain from ruling on a dispute between state officials over their obligations under an interstate compact approved by Congress. He argued that this was not merely a political question but also involved legal issues within the Court's jurisdiction and competence to decide upon, such as whether or not federal law preempts conflicting state laws and how to interpret ambiguous terms in compacts authorized by Congress. Justice Jackson contended that when states enter into agreements sanctioned by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among states, they are no longer acting purely as sovereign entities but rather participating in national governance subject to judicial review like other forms of legislation enacted pursuant to delegated constitutional powers. He further criticized his colleagues' deference towards state courts' interpretation of these compacts because he believed it undermined uniformity across jurisdictions which is essential for maintaining stability and predictability in interstate relations regulated through congressional action.