This case involved a dispute between the Western Union Telegraph Company and the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company. The Telegraph Company had been granted a contract by the state of Georgia to construct and operate a telegraph line along the railroad's right-of-way. The Railroad Company argued that the Telegraph Company had no right to construct the line without its consent. The Supreme Court held that the Telegraph Company had the right to construct the line along the railroad's right-of-way. The Court reasoned that the Telegraph Company had been granted a contract by the state of Georgia, and that the Railroad Company had no right to interfere with the contract. The Court further held that the Railroad Company had no right to prevent the Telegraph Company from constructing the line, as the Railroad Company had no property interest in the right-of-way. The Court concluded that the Telegraph Company had the right to construct the line along the railroad's right-of-way, and that the Railroad Company had no right to interfere with the contract. The Court's decision established that the Telegraph Company had the right to construct the line without the consent of the Railroad Company.

In the case of Western Union Telegraph Company v. Western and Atlantic Railroad Company, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had misinterpreted an act of Congress passed in 1864. The act provided for telegraph companies to construct lines along railroad rights-of-way with permission from the railroads, but it did not give them any right to use or occupy those rights-of-way without such permission. In his dissent, Justice Field noted that while Congress may have intended to provide some benefit to telegraph companies by passing this law, it was not meant as a grant of property rights; rather, it simply allowed them access when granted by the railroad company. He further argued that if Congress had wanted to grant these property rights they would have done so explicitly instead of leaving it up to interpretation by courts. Therefore, he concluded that since no explicit grant was made in this instance then there could be no legal basis for granting such privileges and thus affirmed his disagreement with the majority's decision on this matter.