In Robert Wickliffe v. Thomas D. Owings, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by a citizen of another state against a resident of that same state in which it sat. The appellant argued that since he was not domiciled in the forum state, its courts lacked jurisdiction to hear his case and thus any judgment rendered would be void for want of personal service upon him as required by law. The respondent countered that because both parties were citizens of different states, there existed diversity between them and therefore federal courts could exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over their dispute under Article III Section 2 Clause 1of the U.S Constitution; however, if this argument failed then they should look to see if Congress has granted concurrent or supplemental jurisdiction to those particular matters within each State's respective judicial system pursuant to Article IV Section 1 Clause 2 (the Full Faith & Credit clause). After careful consideration, Chief Justice Taney delivered an opinion on behalf of himself and four other justices holding that while federal courts may have exclusive original jurisdiction when there is complete diversity between two litigants from different states; nevertheless where only partial diversity exists such as here with one party being domiciled outside but still having citizenship within said forum State then it is up to Congress alone through legislation passed pursuant thereto grant supplemental or concurrent jurisdictional authority so long as it does not conflict with existing laws already established therein . Thus ultimately concluding that without Congressional authorization no such power

In the case of Robert Wickliffe v. Thomas D. Owings, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a contract between two parties could be enforced when it had been made without consideration and in violation of a state statute. The majority opinion held that such contracts were not enforceable because they violated public policy as expressed by the state legislature through its statutes. However, Justice McLean dissented from this decision on several grounds. He argued that there was no evidence to suggest that either party intended to violate any law or act contrary to public policy; furthermore, he noted that even if one party did intend for their agreement to contravene public policy, it should still be enforceable so long as both parties agreed upon its terms and conditions before entering into it. Finally, he reasoned that since neither party had suffered any harm due to their agreement being unenforceable under existing laws at the time they entered into it – nor would either suffer any future harm – then enforcing their contract would not cause an injustice or lead society astray from what is right and just according to established legal principles