Term: 2005
Docket: 04-1332
Richard Will, Et Al. v. Susan Hallock, Et Al.
- Pro
04-1332 WILL V. HALLOCK DECISION BELOW: 387 F3d 147 IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: "Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of the District Court's order denying a motion to dismiss under the FTCA's judgment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676?" CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2005 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)'s judgment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676, provides that "[t] he judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title," i.e., the statutory provision that grants subject matter jurisdiction to federal district courts over FTC A cases, "shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." The question presented is: Whether a final judgment in an action brought under Section 1346(b) dismissing the claim on the ground that relief is precluded by one of the FTCA's exceptions to liability, 28 U .S.C. 2680, bars a subsequent action by the claimant against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the FTCA claim. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 03-6221-cv
In the case of Richard Will, et al. v. Susan Hallock, et al., 2005, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of a government agency's immunity from lawsuits under certain circumstances. The dispute began when an IRS agent seized computer equipment from the Hallocks' business for unpaid taxes which led to its closure and bankruptcy filing by the owners. They sued for damages alleging violation of their constitutional rights and statutory protections against unreasonable seizures but lost at district court level due to sovereign immunity granted to federal agencies under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). However, on appeal they won as Second Circuit held that FTCA’s judgment bar did not apply because dismissal was based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than merits. The Supreme Court reversed this decision stating that even if a lawsuit is dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction over subject matter - like sovereign immunity - it still triggers FTCA's "judgment bar" provision preventing plaintiffs from bringing another action on same claim against individual employees involved in original suit.
In the dissenting opinion for Richard Will, et al. v. Susan Hallock, et al., Justice Scalia argued that the majority misinterpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and its "judgment bar" provision. He contended that this provision should prevent a plaintiff from pursuing any further legal action after a judgment has been made in an FTCA suit, regardless of whether it was dismissed due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or on other grounds such as procedural issues. According to him, if Congress had intended for exceptions based on dismissal reasons they would have explicitly stated so in the legislation; their silence suggests no such intention existed. Therefore, he believed that once an FTCA claim is adjudicated - even if dismissed without prejudice - it bars any subsequent claims related to same incident under Bivens or otherwise.
