In the case of William M. Gwinn, Marshal v. Buchanan, Hagan & Co., for the use of William Holliday & Co., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a federal marshal had authority to levy on and sell property in satisfaction of a judgment obtained by an individual against another individual in a state court. The plaintiff argued that as marshal he had such authority under his commission from Congress; however, the defendants contended that it was beyond his power because it interfered with state jurisdiction over civil matters. After reviewing both sides' arguments and relevant precedents, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gwinn and held that federal officers have authority to execute judgments rendered by courts within their respective districts even when those judgments are based upon causes arising under state laws or regulations.

In the dissenting opinion of this case, Justice McLean argued that the plaintiff in error was not entitled to a writ of error from the Supreme Court. He reasoned that since William M. Gwinn had been appointed as Marshal by a court which no longer existed, he could not be considered an officer of any existing court and thus did not have standing to bring suit against Buchanan, Hagan & Co., for use of William Holliday & Co. Furthermore, Justice McLean noted that even if Gwinn were still an active officer at the time he brought suit against Buchanan et al., his claim would still fail because it was based on a debt incurred prior to his appointment as Marshal and therefore outside his jurisdiction. As such, Justice McLean concluded that there was no basis for granting Gwinn's petition for review and affirmed the decision below denying him relief.