Woodfolk v. Seddon was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Woodfolk, was held in a federal prison in Virginia. Woodfolk sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a prisoner's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the prisoner's confinement. The Court's decision in Woodfolk v. Seddon established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the principle that state courts cannot interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

Justice Harlan delivered the dissenting opinion in Woodfolk v. Seddon, arguing that the majority had incorrectly interpreted a provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. He argued that under this act, debtors who were insolvent at the time they filed for bankruptcy could still be discharged from their debts if they met certain conditions and paid into court an amount equal to one-half of their assets. The majority held that such debtors must pay all creditors in full before being eligible for discharge; however, Justice Harlan disagreed with this interpretation and argued instead that Congress intended to allow these debtors some relief by allowing them to pay only half of what was owed. Furthermore, he noted that it would be unjust to deny these individuals any form of relief when other forms are available through state law or other federal statutes. Ultimately, Justice Harlan concluded his dissent by stating his belief that Congress did not intend for bankrupts who were insolvent at filing time to have no recourse whatsoever but rather wanted them given some measure of protection against complete financial ruin due to overwhelming debts incurred prior to bankruptcy proceedings commencing.