In the 1947 case Williams et al. v. Fanning, Postmaster of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant, Fanning. The plaintiffs were publishers who had been denied second-class mailing privileges by Fanning due to their failure to comply with a statute requiring them to disclose information about their ownership and management structures as well as any known bondholders or other security holders. They argued that this requirement violated their First Amendment rights and was therefore unconstitutional; however, the court disagreed on both counts. The court found that Congress has broad power over postal services under Article I Section 8 Clause 7 of the Constitution and can impose reasonable conditions on access to these services without violating constitutional rights. It also held that there is no inherent right for anyone to use mail service at reduced rates provided for second-class mail matter - such privilege being conditional upon compliance with regulations made pursuant thereto. Furthermore, it concluded that disclosing publisher's details does not infringe upon freedom of press because it doesn't prevent from publishing anything they choose but merely requires them to provide certain information if they wish avail themselves of special mailing privileges granted by Congress.

In the dissenting opinion for Williams et al. v. Fanning, Postmaster of Los Angeles, Justice Frank Murphy argued that the majority's decision was a misinterpretation of Congress' intent when it passed legislation allowing postmasters to refuse mail from fraudulent businesses. He believed that this power should only be used in clear cases where fraud is evident and not as a tool to regulate business practices or determine their legitimacy. In his view, the case at hand did not meet these criteria because there was no proof of deceitful conduct by Williams and his associates; they were simply operating an unconventional business model which customers willingly participated in knowing its nature. Therefore, he contended that denying them postal services amounted to unjustified government interference with private enterprise based on subjective judgement rather than objective evidence of fraudulence.